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 Over the last decade, the sentencing of youth has undergone a sea 
change, premised on the fundamental understanding that “children are 
different.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. 
Ed. 2d 407 (2012); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 8, 391 P.3d 
409 (2017). This realization developed due to advances in brain science, 
which has changed the way society understands the actions of its youth. 
“[W]e now know that age may well mitigate a defendant's culpability, 
even if that defendant is over the age of 18.” State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 
680, 695, 358 P.3d 359, 366 (2015). 
 This deceptively simple insight constituted a significant change in 
the construction of a central provision of the SRA: a sentence cannot be 
premised on a factor that does not “relate to the crime.” RCW 9.94A.340; 
State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 92, 110 P.3d 717, 720 (2005); see also David 
Boerner, The Use of Offender Characteristics in Guideline Sentencing: A 
Laboratory Report from Washington State, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 136, 138 
(1996) (“Since its initial foray into sentencing guidelines, the legislature 
has never varied its decision that the primary factors which should 
determine sentence ranges are crime and criminal history.”). 
 For many years, age was considered unrelated to the crime: 
On review, this court rejected the use of age as a mitigating 
factor. In doing so, this court relied on RCW 9.94A.340 in 
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concluding that the age of the defendant does not relate to 
the crime or the previous record of the defendant. Thus, we 
held that this personal factor was not a substantial and 
compelling reason to impose an exceptional sentence. 
 
Law, 154 Wn.2d at 98 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In 
one case where a defendant argued that his young age limited his ability to 
conform his conduct or to recognize its wrongfulness, the court held that 
the “argument borders on the absurd.” State v. Scott, 72 Wn. App. 207, 
218, 866 P.2d 1258 (1993), aff'd sub nom. State v. Ritchie, 126 Wn.2d 
388, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995). 
 Over time, the science of brain development revealed a 
fundamental error in this reasoning. The “distinctive attributes of youth 
diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences 
on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Miller, 
567 U.S. at 472. It is not “absurd” to suggest that youth diminishes 
culpability because there is a “clear connection between youth and 
decreased moral culpability for criminal conduct.” O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 
695.  
 The court below properly understood these implications when it 
granted Kevin Light-Roth’s PRP and remanded for resentencing where the 
court would have the discretion to impose an exceptionally lenient 
sentence if it finds that Mr. Light-Roth’s youth mitigates his crime. When 
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Mr. Light-Roth was sentenced in 2004, the controlling precedent of State 
v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 940 P.2d 633 (1997), foreclosed consideration 
of a defendant’s youthful characteristics as mitigating.  
Mr. Light-Roth acknowledges that O’Dell does not automatically 
entitle him to a reduced sentence. However, the State seeks to prevent Mr. 
Light-Roth from even receiving an opportunity to have his youthfulness 
considered as a mitigating factor under the new guidance of O’Dell. 
Mr. Light-Roth respectfully requests that this Court recognize the 
propriety of resentencing a young adult defendant who, under Ha’mim, did 
not have the opportunity to have his youthfulness meaningfully 
considered. Mr. Light-Roth is entitled to a sentencing proceeding that 
considers how his youthfulness may have impacted his culpability. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether O’Dell constitutes a significant change in the law;  
2. Whether O’Dell applies retroactively; and 
3. Whether O’Dell is material to Light-Roth’s sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 On February 5, 2003, nineteen-year-old Kevin Light–Roth shot 
and killed nineteen-year-old Tython Bonnett at an apartment in Federal 
Way, where two other young men were present. The circumstances 
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leading up to the shooting included the use of methamphetamine, a sex-
tape, and a stolen shotgun.  
 On the day of the shooting, Light–Roth questioned Bonnett about 
his missing shotgun. Bonnett denied taking the gun, but appeared nervous. 
When Bonnett denied knowing about the stolen shotgun, Light–Roth shot 
Bonnett in the chest.  
 Eventually, Light-Roth was implicated in Bonnett’s murder. When 
interrogated, Light–Roth waived his Miranda rights and initially denied 
killing Bonnett. But when the detective told Light–Roth that witnesses had 
reported that he shot Bonnett, Light–Roth surmised that the others present 
had given statements, and attempted to exchange a confession for 
complete immunity—an offer that the detective refused. When the 
detective left the interview for a short time, Light–Roth used a pen to 
remove his leg shackles and handcuffs and climbed into the ceiling crawl 
space. The ceiling collapsed and he fell to the floor in the next room. 
When the officers entered the room, Light–Roth said they were going to 
have to shoot him. Luckily for Light-Roth, the officers were able to 
restrain him. 
The State charged Light–Roth with murder in the second degree 
while armed with a firearm, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm. 
He was convicted on both counts. At sentencing, Light-Roth received the 
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maximum standard range sentence of 335 months. State v. Light-Roth, 139 
Wn. App. 1093, 2007 WL 2234613 at *5 (Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished). 
Light-Roth did not request an exceptionally lenient sentence.  
Light-Roth’s PRP included the declarations of his mother (Noreen 
Light) and a cousin (Kristi O’Brien), both of whom described his 
personality, behavior and maturity level as a child and up to the time of his 
crime. His mother stated in part:  
3. From an early age (in vitro) he was observed as a hyper-active 
child. His short attention span, distracted nature and impulsivity 
impacted his relationships with other children and his success in 
the classroom. With a late June birthday, Kevin was also one of 
the youngest in his grade, adding to the difference in his ability to 
delay gratification and apply appropriate social skills, compared 
to others in his peer cohort. Early in grade school, Kevin was 
diagnosed with ADHD and behavior management plans were 
implemented (with little success) to help him self-manage his 
impulse control. 
**** 
6. In his early teens, Kevin began using alcohol and, later, other 
drugs. His drug use exacerbated his inability to judge risk, and to 
relate actions with outcomes. He befriended others who were using 
drugs and was increasingly drawn to high-risk, and illegal, 
behavior (beginning with shoplifting alcohol). Each incident 
involved alcohol or other drugs. Each time, he expressed sincere 
remorse and voiced his desire to think things through before 
acting; but he did not seem to have the ability to do so. 
 
7. At the age of 19, Kevin still continued to exhibit substantial 
impulsivity and a limited ability to manage his behavior by 
thinking through the consequences of his actions and by being 
drawn to risky and exciting behaviors - both legal and illegal. In 
fact, it was not for several years after Kevin's arrest and trial did 





Ms. O’Brien recounted:  
 
5. Prior to when Kevin went to prison, I do not feel he knew how 
to properly act or react in social situations. On many occasions he 
would say inappropriate things. Often he would repeat lines or 
scenes he had watched from television or movies when having 
casual conversations with myself and others. I believe Kevin was 
stunted socially and emotionally due to unintentional neglect. 
 
6. Kevin has always been highly intelligent, however very 
immature in many ways. I also know Kevin started experimenting 
with drugs and alcohol at a very young age as well. When 
intoxicated his behavior was erratic and out of control. There have 
been times when Kevin has confided to me while in tears, telling 
me he did not know how to be normal or fit in to society. It 
 would break my heart because I knew he was just a little boy 
 trying to raise himself without a lot of example to follow. 
ARGUMENT 
 
 Under RCW 10.73.100(6), a significant, retroactive, material 
change in the law exempts a PRP from the one-year time bar for collateral 
attacks. Mr. Light-Roth’s PRP qualifies for this exemption because he was 
sentenced at a time when youth was considered a personal factor unrelated 
to the crime. The law has since changed, and the change in the law applies 
retroactively and is material to Mr. Light-Roth’s case. This Court should 
remand for resentencing, to allow for Mr. Light-Roth’s culpability to be 
reevaluated in light of evidence of youthfulness. 
A. O’Dell Was a Significant Change in the Law.  
 
O’Dell constituted a significant change in the law because it 
overruled and abrogated prior precedent, including State v. Law, 154 
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Wn.2d 85, 95, 110 P.3d 717 (2005); State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 940 
P.2d 633 (1997); and State v. Scott, 72 Wn. App. 207, 218–19, 866 P.2d 
1258 (1993), aff'd sub nom State v. Ritchie, 126 Wn.2d 388, 894 P.2d 
1308 (1995). 
1. A Significant Change in the Law Occurs When an 
Intervening Opinion Effectively Overturns a Prior 
Appellate Decision. 
 
 The touchstone for whether there has been a significant change in 
the law for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6) is whether the defendant 
“could have made the argument” prior to the alleged change in the law. In 
re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 258-59, 111 P.3d 837 
(2005); In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 153 Wn.2d 44, 51, 101 P.3d 854 
(2004) (“Turay II”); In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71, 83, 74 
P.3d 1194 (2003) (“Turay I”); In re Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 145 
Wn.2d 258, 264, 36 P.3d 1005 (2001), as amended (Jan. 15, 2002). This 
Court has stated numerous times that the significant change in the law 
exception in RCW 10.73.100(6) requires a showing of a case (or statute) 
that effectively overturns prior material law so that the arguments 
currently at issue were previously “unavailable” to the litigants.1 Lavery, 
                                                          
1 Not every decision announcing a new application of the law constitutes a significant 
change in the law. This Court has made clear that “[a]n appellate decision that settles a 
point of law without overturning prior precedent” is not a significant change in the law. 
Turay I, 150 Wn.2d at 83, citing In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wn.2d 687, 696,   
9 P.3d 206 (2000). 
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154 Wn.2d at 258-59; Turay II, 153 Wn.2d at 51-52; In re Pers. Restraint 
of Greening, 141 Wn.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000); see also In re Pers. 
Restraint of Rowland, 149 Wn. App. 496, 503, 204 P.3d 953 (2009).  
The court in Greening elaborated on the nature of this exception:  
While litigants have a duty to raise available arguments in a 
timely fashion and may later be procedurally penalized for 
failing to do so... they should not be faulted for having 
omitted arguments that were essentially unavailable at the 
time, as occurred here. We hold that where an intervening 
opinion has effectively overturned a prior appellate 
decision that was originally determinative of a material 
issue, the intervening opinion constitutes a ‘significant 
change in the law’ for purposes of exemption from 
procedural bars. 
Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697. Recently, this Court quoted this language as 
signaling that “[t]he ‘significant change’ language is intended to reduce 
procedural barriers to collateral relief in the interests of fairness and 
justice.” In re Pers. Restraint Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 104, 351 
P.3d 138 (2015) (citing Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697) (emphasis in 
original). 
2. O’Dell Overturned Prior Authority Interpreting RCW 
9.94A.340 and 9.94A.390 that Foreclosed the Consideration 
of a Youth’s Immature Judgment and Impulsiveness as 
Mitigating Factors.  
 
O’Dell overturned prior authority that held that youth could not be 
considered a mitigating factor because it did not relate to the crime. Before 
O’Dell, the controlling interpretation of RCW 9.94A.340 and 9.94A.390 
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(recodified as RCW 9.94A.535 by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6) with regard to 
how age and youth could be considered as mitigating factors by a court 
when imposing an exceptional sentence was set forth in Ha’mim, 132 
Wn.2d at 846. Specifically, with regard to RCW 9.94A.340 and 
9.94A.390, Ha’mim set forth three points: 
(1) under the statute, age is a personal factor that does not relate to 
the crime and may not, on its own, be used to impose an 
exceptional sentence, Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 846; 
 
(2)  age could be relevant if it related to the impairment of a 
“defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or 
her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of the law” id. (citing RCW 9.94A.390(1)(e) 
(predecessor statute to RCW 9.94A.535)); and 
 
(3) a youth’s impulsiveness and lack of mature judgment could not 
serve as mitigating factors under RCW 9.94A.390(1)(e), at 
least with regard to crimes that are not common teenage vices, 
id. (citing Scott, 72 Wash. App. at 218-19). 
 
Ha’mim’s general pronouncement that age could be relevant is 
largely foreclosed, though, by its endorsement of Scott’s determination 
that lack of mature judgment and impulsiveness based on youth could not 
qualify for mitigation under RCW 9.94A.390(1)(e) and that such an 
“argument borders on the absurd.” Id. (quoting Scott, 72 Wn. App. at 218). 
After Ha’mim, trial courts that granted exceptionally lenient sentences 
based on age and/or youth were routinely reversed on appeal unless they 
identified other mitigating factors. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 184 Wn. App. 
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1024, 2014 WL 5685535 (Nov. 4, 2014) (unpublished, nonbinding 
authority) (relying on Ha’mim, reversing exceptionally lenient sentence 
that was based on defendant’s age, 18 years and 9 months old); State v. 
Magana, 165 Wn. App. 1008, 2011 WL 6091099 (Dec. 8, 2011) 
(unpublished, nonbinding authority) (relying on Ha’mim, finding that trial 
court erred by considering defendant’s age as a mitigating factor).  
Ha’mim declared that with regard to RCW 9.94A.340, “[t]he age 
of the defendant does not relate to the crime or the previous record of the 
defendant.” Id. at 847. It further endorsed the view that wrongful conduct 
“cannot seriously be blamed” on youth and its attendant characteristics. Id. 
at 846-47 (quoting Scott, 72 Wn. App. at 218–19) (emphasis in original). 
Law reinforced the notion that youth is a personal factor not related to the 
crime and therefore could be relied upon to mitigate the sentence. Law, 
154 Wn.2d at 98. 
 O’Dell rejected these sweeping conclusions, stating, “[I]n light of 
what we know today about adolescents’ cognitive and emotional 
development, we conclude that youth may, in fact “relate to [a 
defendant’s] crime.” 183 Wn.2d at 695 (citations omitted). This Court also 
noted “that it is far more likely to diminish a defendant’s culpability than 
this court implied in Ha’mim; and that youth can, therefore, amount to a 
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substantial and compelling factor, in particular cases, justifying a sentence 
below the standard range.” O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d. at 696. 
Though it left intact Ha’mim’s holding that age is not a per se 
mitigating factor automatically entitling every youthful defendant to an 
exceptional sentence, O’Dell stated explicitly, “[t]o the extent that this 
court’s reasoning in Ha’mim is inconsistent, we disavow that reasoning.” 
Id. at 695-96. The reasoning disavowed was Ha’mim’s interpretation of 
RCW 9.94A.340 and 9.94A.390, which precluded a sentencing court from 
considering as a non-statutory mitigating factor a youth’s lack of maturity 
and impulsiveness based on the notion that they do not relate to a 
defendant’s crime or culpability. Because the argument that youth relates 
to the crime was unavailable prior to O’Dell, there has been a significant 
change in the law. 
  
B. O’Dell Applies Retroactively. 
“Whether a changed legal standard applies retroactively is a 
distinct inquiry from whether there has been a significant change in the 
law.” In re Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 103. Decisions based on statutory 
interpretation always apply retroactively because “[o]nce the Court has 
determined the meaning of a statute, that is what the statute has meant 
since its enactment.” In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 
568, 933 P.2d 1019 (1993); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 152 
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Wn.2d 853, 860 n.2, 100 P.3d 801 (2004) (“statute must be applied as 
construed to conduct occurring since its enactment”); Greening, 141 
Wn.2d at 693 (“When this court construes a statute, its original meaning is 
clarified. Our ruling is thus automatically ‘retroactive.’”) (emphasis in 
original); In re Pers. Restraint of Moore, 116 Wn.2d 30, 37, 803 P.2d 300 
(1991) (“[O]nce a statute has been construed by the highest court of the 
state . . . that is what the statute has meant since its enactment.”) (citing 
State v. Darden, 99 Wn.2d 675, 679, 663 P.2d 1352 (1983)) (emphasis in 
original).  
 The SRA was designed to apply equally to all offenders “without 
discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime or the 
previous record of the defendant.” RCW 9.94A.340. See also David 
Boerner, Sentencing in Washington, § 2.5(a) (1985). A number of goals 
motivated the passage of the SRA, including the desire to combat 
perceived “unwarranted” sentencing disparities. David Boerner & 
Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME & 
JUST. 71, 84-85 (2001). 
In the years following Ha’mim and Law, neuroscience led this 
Nation’s courts to dramatically alter the landscape with regard to the 
sentencing of youths. Applying this guidance, this Court in O’Dell 
rejected the underlying rationale of Ha’mim that prevented arguments 
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about youth and its attendant characteristics from being fairly considered 
under the SRA. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695–96. O’Dell stated that youth, 
rather than just being a personal characteristic unrelated to the crime, 
“may, in fact relate to [a defendant’s] crime. Id. at 696. O’Dell further 
stated that “youth can, therefore amount to a substantial and compelling 
factor, in particular cases justifying a sentence below the standard range.” 
Id. Further, this Court explicitly disavowed the reasoning in Ha’mim 
inconsistent with its holding that “a trial court must be allowed to consider 
youth as a mitigating factor when imposing a sentence on an offender like 
O’Dell.” Id. (emphasis added). 
In addition to construing the SRA’s distinction between “personal” 
and “crime-related” factors, O’Dell construed the SRA’s definition of 
“offender.” RCW 9.94A.030(35) (“a person who has committed a felony 
established by state law and is eighteen years of age or older...”). Noting 
that the legislature made all adult defendants in general equally culpable 
for equivalent crimes, O’Dell construed “offender” so that particular 
vulnerabilities—for example, impulsivity, poor judgment, and 
susceptibility to outside influences—merit different treatment. O'Dell, 183 




[T]here was no way for our legislature to consider these 
differences when it made the SRA sentencing ranges 
applicable to all offenders over 18 years of age. Thus, we 
decline to hold that the legislature necessarily considered 
the relationship between age and culpability when it made 
the SRA applicable to all defendants 18 and older. 
Id. at 693.  
O’Dell’s construction of the provisions of the SRA extends not just 
to the definitions of “offender,” and “personal” versus crime-related 
factors, but also to the list of mitigating factors found in RCW 
9.94A.535(1) (successor statute to RCW 9.94A.390), holding the scope of 
those mitigating factors to now permit the consideration of youth. O’Dell, 
183 Wn.2d at 696 (“[A] trial court must be allowed to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor[.]”); id. at 698–99 (“We hold that a defendant’s 
youthfulness can support an exceptional sentence below the standard 
range.”).  
Because O’Dell interpreted the SRA—a statute—courts apply this 
new interpretation to all cases sentenced under the SRA. 
 
C. O’Dell Is Material to Mr. Light-Roth’s Sentence. 
 
O’Dell is material to Mr. Light-Roth’s sentence even though he did 
not seek an exceptionally lenient sentence. A change in the law is material 
if the defendant can make a showing (in his PRP or CrR 7.8 motion):  
(1) the old law was in effect when he was sentenced; and  
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(2) he presents facts showing the relevance of the new law to him.  
Cf. Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wn.2d 50, 54, 380 P.2d 870 (1963) (“ʻmaterial 
facts’ are those ‘. . . upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.’”) 
(quoting Capitol Hill Methodist Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 
359, 364, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958)). 
Requiring a defendant to have previously sought an exceptionally 
lenient sentence is contrary to the “change in the law” test set forth by this 
Court. If a defendant must show that he could not have made the instant 
argument under the old law because it was unavailable, it is inconsistent to 
then require him to have made it to establish materiality. As the Court of 
Appeals correctly noted in this case, it is:  
unreasonable to hold that a case announced a significant 
change because it made a new argument available to a 
defendant, and then hold that the change is not material 
because the defendant did not make that argument. We 
conclude that the change in the law O'Dell announced was 
material to Light-Roth's sentence because, under O'Dell, 
Light-Roth can now argue that his youth justified an 
exceptional sentence below the standard range. 
 
In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 200 Wn. App. 149, 161, 401 P.3d 459 
(2017); see also Barnett v. Roper, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 
2013) (requiring a habeas petitioner to raise squarely foreclosed claims, 
would have the “perverse effect” of encouraging federal habeas lawyers to 
raise every conceivable (and not so conceivable) challenge).  
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Light-Roth has made the showing that he has at least a viable claim 
that he is entitled to an exceptionally lenient sentence under O’Dell. The 
sworn and uncontradicted statements he appended to his PRP are similar 
to the examples of “lay testimony” cited in O'Dell for the purpose of 
“evaluating whether youth diminished a defendant's culpability.” 183 
Wn.2d at 697-98. 
His mother’s observation that “[a]t the age of 19, Kevin still 
continued to exhibit substantial impulsivity and a limited ability to manage 
his behavior by thinking through the consequences of his actions and by 
being drawn to risky and exciting behaviors - both legal and illegal,” is 
consistent with the science of adolescent brain development and has 
relevance to the homicide committed by Light-Roth, as well as his actions 
following his arrest.  
While the determination of whether a change in the law is “material” 
takes into account the facts presented at the original sentencing hearing, it 
should not be construed to preclude the presentation of previously 
unpresented facts relevant to new law. 
  
D. Mr. Light-Roth Is Entitled to Resentencing Under O’Dell. 
O’Dell is a significant, retroactive, material change in the law and, 
therefore, applies to Mr. Light-Roth’s PRP. Under O’Dell, the appropriate 
remedy for Mr. Light-Roth is to remand for resentencing. See 183 Wn.2d 
17 
 
at 698–99 (holding “that a defendant’s youthfulness can support an 
exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable to an adult 
felony defendant, and that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion 
to decide when that is”). This Court went on to note that “failure to 
exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion subject to reversal.” Id. 
at 697 (citing State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 
(2005) (the trial court’s failure to consider an exceptional sentence 
authorized by statute is reversible error)). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision 
of the Court of Appeals, which granted Respondent’s PRP and remanded 
for resentencing. 
DATED this 26th day of January 2018. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
 
/s/ Jeffrey Erwin Ellis 
Jeffrey Erwin Ellis No. 17139 
Law Office of Alsept & Ellis 
621 SW Morrison St. Ste. 1025 
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